The Conversation – June 1, 2023
What to expect from Erdoğan, his ultranationalist
Alliance and their ‘Family Values’ Pledges
By Balki Begumhan Bayhan
After a bitter and hard-fought campaign that went to a second run-off vote, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has retained the Turkish presidency in an election that some deemed as “free but not fair”. Having first won power in 2003, Erdoğan has been able to extend his rule for a further five years by creating an alliance with ultranationalist parties.
A key aspect of the next term is likely to be a hardline conservative agenda. An agreement between the Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and his hardline Islamist New Welfare party (YRP) allies has pledged to reevaluate existing laws to “protect the integrity of the family”.
Turkey’s LGBTQ+ community is likely to be a target. Erdoğan and his allies ramped up anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric during the election campaign. This is by no means a new part of Erdoğan’s programme, but it has intensified in the last few months. For instance, the AKP and coalition partner the YRP signed a declaration which suggested potential discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community could follow. The YRP has previously called for the closure of LGBTQ+ organisations.
Immediately after his victory was announced, Erdoğan accused the opposition of promoting LGBTQ+ rights while stressing that “LGBT forces” had not been able to infiltrate the AKP.
Women’s rights are also at risk. The 6284 law, which aims to protect women, particularly from domestic violence, was introduced by the AKP government in 2012. Both radical Islamist parties within Erdoğan’s coalition – YRP and Huda Par – have called for it to be repealed and made their support for Erdoğan conditional on a pledge to amend this law.
This comes against a backdrop of high levels of violence against women in Turkey. In 2022 at least 116 women were murdered by their partners.
Huda Par has also proposed criminalising extra-marital sex and adultery, getting rid of alimony rights for women and argued for single-sex education.
The Erdoğan-led majority in parliament was propped up by another of AKP’s coalition partners, the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement party (MHP). And they also received backing from the extreme nationalist presidential candidate, Sinan Oğan of the ATA (Ancestral) Alliance party, who won around 5% of the vote in the first round, before declaring his support for Erdoğan.
When it became clear that anti-immigrant views had been popular in the first round, opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu pivoted to a hardline anti-immigration stance in the second round. Billboards promised Syrian refugees would have to leave the country, if he was elected.
Rising anti-Syrian rhetoric
The whole campaign was marked by rising hostility against the 3.6 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Syrians have already been targeted by violent protests that damaged Syrian-owned properties, as well as physical attacks and murders. Just before the second round, the killing of a 28-year old Syrian man living in Turkey raised fears about what might happen next.
It seems unlikely that such incidents – and the near constant hate speech that Syrians are subjected to – will decrease after this election result, especially now that Erdogan is so dependent on the ultranationalists in parliament. The pressure from these parties may cause the regime to target Syrians even more directly. Even before the election Erdoğan vowed “to repatriate refugees” and talked about “resettling” one million Syrian refugees.
Ultranationalists grasp power
The increased power of the ultranationalist right and their rhetoric and ideas is also a threat to Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Kurds have already experienced an increase in repression since Erdoğan adopted a more nationalistic and anti-minority policy direction in 2015. The 2023 election campaign saw him ramp up the nationalist rhetoric further.
He portrayed jailed Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtas as “a terrorist” and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic party (HDP) as a front for the outlawed PKK paramilitary group. Erdoğan returned to his attack on Demirtas in his election victory speech while the crowd chanted for the death penalty.
We should expect to see an increase in anti-Kurdish policies. This could include further crackdowns on Kurdish organisations, in particular the possible closure of the HDP.
With an ongoing economic crisis threatening the livelihoods of many Turks and prices rising dramatically, Erdoğan may hope a wave of nationalism could distract his citizens from their financial troubles. With inflation running at around 40% and the lira having lost a fifth of its value over the past 12 months, there’s definitely a lot of distraction going to be needed.
Balki Begumhan Bayhan, PhD Candidate in Politics, Coventry University
Economic dynamics in the context of elections: Pre and post-election analysis
By Levent Yılmaz
Türkiye has completed its elections with a remarkably high turnout. Following the parliamentary arithmetic revealed on May 14, President Erdogan was re-elected with a 52.2% vote in the second round on May 28.
The challenging economic conditions in Türkiye were evident in the pre-election period. The currency crisis in 2018, followed by the Covid-19 pandemic at the beginning of 2020, and the escalating global tensions due to the Russia-Ukraine War, have had significant negative impacts on the economy.
Rapidly rising exchange rates, increasing inflation, temporary closures of businesses due to the pandemic, and the halt in global trade have put additional strain on developing economies like Türkiye. These factors have contributed to a period of increased difficulty for such countries.
Furthermore, the tightening cycles of major central banks, which involved significant interest rate hikes to combat post-pandemic inflation, further intensified the pressure on the currencies of developing countries. Türkiye, of course, did not escape the effects of this situation.
Both domestically and internationally, the deteriorating economic climate led to an attempt to create a perception that voters would distance themselves from Erdogan in the pre-election period, regardless of the opposing candidate. Particularly in the opposition media, we observed the prolonged emphasis on this issue, supported by later inconsistent polls, and attempts to influence voters based on some negative macroeconomic indicators.
Clearly, the literature in the Western world frequently employs the linear correlation between a country's economic performance and the percentage of votes garnered by the ruling power and/or leader. In fact, the opposition often designed their election campaign around Süleyman Demirel's famous quote, "There is no power that the pot cannot overthrow."
However, there was an overlooked factor by the opposition. Despite the economic challenges, income increases at compensatory levels, along with wage hikes, helped mitigate the losses in purchasing power, resulting in the relatively lesser impact of economic difficulties. The prolonged supportive movement of the credit channel also aided in sustaining production and consequently employment.
On the other hand, the biggest mistake was reading the Turkish voter solely through the lens of economic pragmatism. There was an expectation that voters would make their choices solely based on the deterioration of economic conditions. However, as I previously mentioned in this column on May 13, 2023, "...the correlation between economic conditions and the ruling party's vote, as we have seen in other country examples, often did not work in Türkiye. In many elections, we observed that economic conditions took a backseat, and the voters prioritized the foreign policy stance and national issues." Thus, I expressed my belief that the voters would lean towards Erdogan in the current election process. And indeed, it turned out that way.
While the pre-election situation in the economy was as described, attention shifted back to the economy after the completion of the election process. We can see that Erdogan, who has been reelected, has placed the economy as one of his top agenda items. In both his victory speech on election night and his speech at the 79th TOBB General Assembly, Erdogan delivered messages emphasizing his sensitivity towards "inflation."
Of course, the issue is not limited to inflation alone. The most curious question is how the economic management will shape up in the new cabinet. Various sources circulate information that requires confirmation on this matter. Ultimately, President Erdogan will make the final decision. However, in order to make a sound interpretation regarding the trajectory of the economy post-election, it is necessary to see the formation of the economic management and how it will operate.
Three Questions:
Erdogan’s victory paves way for stronger ties with the Gulf
By Jonathan Fenton-Harvey
In three questions Jonathan Fenton-Harvey explains the present and future of Türkiye's relations with Gulf states under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government.
How do the Arab Gulf states view President Erdogan’s victory?
After the first round of elections in Türkiye suggested that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s eventual victory was almost certain, Gulf leaders wasted no time in congratulating the reigning Turkish President. When Erdogan’s second-round victory was imminent, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was the first to express his felicitations to Erdogan, underscoring Doha’s close bilateral ties with his government and its desires to strengthen their pre-existing relationship.
United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Mohammad bin Zayed also voiced his warm wishes for Erdogan's presidency and expressed his anticipation for further enhancing the strategic partnership between their countries. This interaction was telling, as it exemplifies optimism over the evolving and cooperative dynamics between the UAE and Türkiye’s relations.
Similarly, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman congratulated Erdogan, while King Salman conveyed his well wishes through a congratulatory cable that also praised the relations shared by the two nations. The cable also praised the joint efforts to strengthen comprehensive cooperation between the two nations.
Prior to the election, Erdogan acknowledged the Arab Gulf states for their recent financial contributions to Türkiye’s Central Bank, although he refrained from specifying the governments involved. Similar past support from the leading Gulf states has served as a testament to the long-term confidence they have placed in Erdogan's government.
Moreover, and particularly as the president’s competitor Kemal Kilicdaroglu reportedly planned to review certain economic and security ties with the Gulf states, the status quo will likely continue and bilateral relations may even advance further.
What has caused relations between Türkiye and the Gulf to strengthen?
In recent years, what can be considered a 'great reset' has taken place in the region. The rivalry that once pitted UAE and Saudi Arabia against Türkiye and Qatar, is now a thing of the past. Indeed, the divisions that emerged after the post-Arab Spring clashes have largely eased, with conflicts in Libya and Syria subsiding. Now, their attention is focused on new global challenges.
For instance, the controversial nature of the US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan raised questions about the reliability of Joe Biden's administration to act as a security guarantor, prompting regional governments to take security cooperation into their own hands. Additionally, the war in Ukraine has presented fresh global economic and security challenges, further reshaping the regional political landscape.
When it comes to the war in Ukraine, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye have adopted similar philosophies. Despite US pressure, they have carefully balanced relations between the US and Russia, to avoid getting entangled in a new cold war, while diversifying away from the Washington-led alliance. Moreover, they have also shown similar levels of tolerance towards economic relations with China.
Beyond these pressing global challenges, the Gulf states and Türkiye may recognize the mutual benefits of cooperation. After all, Ankara was designated as the first strategic ally of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2008, before the divisions of the post-Arab Spring era took hold. Considering their status as major regional economies, they now seek to develop relations that were hindered by the divisions of the 2010s.
What kind of cooperation can we expect in the future?
Considering the aforementioned challenges and deepening relations, cooperation between the GCC and Türkiye is likely to continue and expand in the near future. The deep relations between Qatar and Türkiye, which may have been challenged under a potential Kilicdaroglu victory, could lead to more collaboration over regional and domestic challenges. For instance, Qatar's commitment to fund housing projects for repatriated refugees in northern Syria exemplifies Doha's potential as a leading partner for Ankara over the next five years.
Wider economic ties are poised for improvement. Bilateral investment discussions between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye have gained momentum since their reconciliation in 2021. Talks and actions over investments have spanned energy infrastructure, healthcare, biotechnology, agriculture technology, financial services, real estate, and many other sectors. Türkiye’s desire for increased Gulf investment, given its recent experience with US sanctions, could make the GCC an even more attractive economic partner.
Security cooperation will also likely continue to increase. Turkish drone sales, notably to the UAE, have already contributed to this. Saudi Arabia may also hope to acquire these drones, following recent defense cooperation discussions with Ankara. Kuwait and Oman have also shown interest in Turkish defense systems, given their own purchases of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. While this would boost economic cooperation, as the Gulf could be a marketplace for Türkiye’s defense industry, there is also a clear security dimension to the Gulf’s growing relations with Ankara. This may in turn lead to collaboration over any future regional challenges.
Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a researcher and journalist focusing on conflict and geopolitics in the Middle East and North Africa, primarily related to the Gulf region.
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